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Airline alliances have a long history yet there is no academic consensus on how 
they affect price levels and their impact on price dispersion has not yet been 
studied. We address this ques�on using a novel methodology mo�vated by the 
service homogeniza�on and increased price compe��on in this industry in the 
recent years. Establishing an equivalence between the online sales process and 
a reverse English auc�on, we use methods from auc�on econometrics to work in 
a new way with the standard industry data set: using individual �cket sales where 
only aggregated prices have been used in the past. Applicable to other industries 
where sellers compete in prices, this approach allows us to reconsider the effect 
of airline alliances on the distribu�on of airfares in the US domes�c market. We 
find lower price mean and dispersion in markets where airlines belong to an 
alliance as a result of the lower variability of costs. The methodology we apply 
here can be used to study any distribu�on of individualized prices, which are now 
prevalent since the advent of the digital economy. 
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Airline coopera�on plays a unique and crucial role in the industrial organiza�on 
of interna�onal and domes�c air travel. Most airlines cooperate in some manner, 
varying from a codeshare agreement on a par�cular market where airlines not 
opera�ng a flight are allowed to sell �ckets on that flight, to the more integrated 
arrangement of an alliance. There is no consensus among economists on the 
magnitude or/and the intensity of the effect of coopera�on among airlines on 
prices or welfare. Airlines implement complex pricing prac�ces to beter extract 
consumer’s surplus, which blurs studying the impact of coopera�on on prices. To 
address this ques�on, the analysis usually proposed in the literature is somehow 
incomplete as it mainly focuses on how aggregated prices are affected by 
coopera�on. However, as aggregated figures ignore heterogeneity, their use can 
create heteroskedas�cy which can affect the precision of the measure of impact 
of coopera�on, an issue which is well recognized in most of the literature on 
airlines.1  
To contribute to the empirical assessment of airline coopera�on’s impact on 
prices, we propose an original approach that allows the use of individual 
transac�on prices to es�mate the airfare distribu�on rather than studying 
aggregated figures. We argue that the internet �cket sales process leads airlines 
to face Bertrand compe��on, which is equivalent to a Dutch reverse auc�on 
under certain assump�ons (see for instance Maskin and Riley (1984), Spulber 
(1990) or Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004)). In our model, there is one buyer 
(the passenger or auc�oneer) and mul�ple sellers (the airlines or bidders) who 
offer compe�ng prices or fares; these fares are observable by all the sellers who 
can modify their offer according to their compe�tors’ offer. 2 The transac�on 
price at which the passenger buys the �cket is equal to the second lowest 
reserva�on cost among the compe�tors, where the reserva�on cost is the 
minimum acceptable compensa�on for the airline. 3  This result allows us to 
interpret the observed airfares as winning bids and to analyze their distribu�on 
by methods pertaining to the econometrics of auc�ons.  
The empirical auc�on literature has developed various methods for the 
es�ma�on of auc�on outcomes.4 Our contribu�on relies on applying for the first 
 
1 For more information on the problem of aggregation see for isntanceBlundell and Stoker (2005)’s 
survey or the more recent Stocker (2016) present techniques that allows to attenuate the heterogeneity 
problems created when using aggregated figures in specific scenarios. 
2 For each product in our sample, that is an operating carrier and city pair combination, on average 91.3% 
of the transactions present different prices. If instead we focus on city pairs, independently of the carriers, 
62.2% of the transactions present different prices. 
3  Note that Klemperer (2004) states that theoretically such a “process corresponds exactly to the 
standard ascending auction among bidders competing to buy an object.” He therefore refers to “ascending 
auctions” even for reverse auctions. We prefer to use the term “reverse auction” which is more coherent 
with our context. Note also that we use the term of reservation cost (instead of simply cost) to emphasize 
that we consider both operating and opportunity costs as explained in Section 3. 
4 For a recent survey, see Gentry et al. (2018). 
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�me such methods to describe an internet sale process. In the recent years, we 
have seen a spectacular increase in the number and popularity of search engines, 
websites and applica�ons that compare prices. On the firm side, we have 
similarly observed an increase in the deployment and sophis�ca�on of yield 
management or pricing op�miza�on techniques.5 More and more sectors see 
their goods and services traded online, with near-zero cost of price comparison 
and under heightened price compe��on. Some examples are car rentals, hotels, 
trains or more generally any market where firms offer similar products or services 
and compete exclusively on prices based on private reserva�on costs, a setup 
corresponding to a reverse English auc�on. To present this new approach in a 
tractable manner, we focus therea�er on symmetric duopoly markets, i.e., 
markets with two companies that share a similar cost structure and similar 
product characteris�cs such as frequencies. 
We apply this methodology to revisit the literature studying airline alliance 
effects on prices, where we make three important contribu�ons. First, we 
directly work with individual prices while tradi�onally, the impact of alliances -or 
coopera�ve agreements more generally- is es�mated in terms of average prices, 
aggregated over passengers, per airline, per market and per period. Second, our 
approach allows for a more comprehensive treatment of the price distribu�on 
by jointly modeling airfares’ mean and the variance. Third, we es�mate the 
impact of alliances on the variability of �cket prices, which has not been 
considered before, neither by the literature on airline coopera�on, nor by the 
literature studying the effect of compe��on on airfare dispersion. 
An alliance is a partnership agreements between two or more compe�ng 
firms. There exist a wide range of such agreements in the different sectors of the 
economy, see for instance the review by Kang and Sakai (2000) on interna�onal 
alliances; our work is focused on airlines alliances. Alliances allow carriers to 
cooperate, while maintaining certain boundaries and not cons�tu�ng a merger. 
Most of the prac�ces that alliance partners can engage in are considered 
beneficial for consumers: they can market their partners’ �ckets and collaborate 
in supplying a product (codeshare), offering a larger network reach (foreign 
carriers usually cannot operate within the domes�c market known as cabotage); 
they can coordinate their schedules, improving the service quality; and they can 
share frequent flyer programs and promo�onal campaigns, providing more value 
to their customers. Furthermore, an alliance may lead to lower costs due to 
economies of density, because partners share airport equipment and staff. 
Despite the listed benefits, the impact of alliances over consumers in terms of 
prices is s�ll open to discussion. There is general agreement that airline alliances 
can reduce prices for interna�onal services, as suggested by Park (1997), 
Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2001), Brueckner et al. (2011) or 
 
5 Yield or revenue management is a variable pricing strategy that allows firms to increase revenues in an 




Calzareta et al. (2017). Most of the proposed products on interna�onal air 
markets, namely, connec�ng flights, combine the services of at least two carriers. 
For instance, to travel from city A in one country to city C in another country, a 
stop is required in city B, with the routes AB and BC operated by two different 
carriers. To the benefit of passengers, the alliance can eliminate the double 
marginaliza�on problem that appears when each of the carriers prices its service 
independently from the other. Now, on markets where the alliance partners offer 
the same service, called overlapping markets, the double marginaliza�on 
problem does not exist, and airfares may be higher because of the alliance if 
there are not enough compe�tors (Brueckner and Singer 2019). As overlapping 
interna�onal markets represent a small percentage of the total number of 
markets, the social costs of higher prices are in this case largely compensated by 
the social benefits due to the removal of double marginaliza�on on connec�ng 
flights. That is why interna�onal alliances are generally approved.  
The situa�on used to be different for U.S. domes�c alliances, where carriers 
are free to provide service between any two ci�es and their networks can overlap 
significantly. 6  The compe��ve effects of alliances in such markets caused 
concerns for the relevant authori�es, one example being the 
Con�nental/Northwest/Delta alliance in 2002. The U.S. Department of 
Transporta�on (the DOT) argued that the process of communica�ng the 
necessary informa�on to organize the codesharing service would facilitate 
carriers to collude explicitly or tacitly on prices and/or service in the overlapping 
markets. Despite these allega�ons, the Department of Jus�ce allowed the 
forma�on of domes�c alliances that eventually transformed into mergers, while 
their impact on airfares in the overlapping domes�c markets was s�ll uncertain. 
To reassess such decisions, we implement our methodology on the US 
domes�c direct markets operated by legacy carriers during the third quarter of 
2015 and 2016. The alliance status of the airlines defines two market types, 
alliance or non-alliance markets. If the two airlines opera�ng in a market belong 
to the same alliance, we denote it as an alliance market. These are the 
overlapping markets of the alliance partners. The market is non-alliance if the 
two airlines do not belong to the same alliance.  
We show that, in the considered duopoly markets, prices are lower and less 
disperse in alliance markets compared to non-alliance markets; more precisely, 
prices are 10 percent lower , and standard devia�on is 14.4 percent lower. This 
finding suggests that alliance agreements lead to efficiency gains that are passed 
on to consumers.  
This implies that alliances are welfare improving , as is generally observed in 
interna�onal alliances. A reduc�on of the price mean is considered to be welfare 
enhancing for a given quality level. Our methodology allows compe��on 
authori�es to expand their focus from only the effect of coopera�on on the mean 
 
6 The number of available slots and their allocation is regulated by the Department of Transportation at 
only a few airports due to traffic congestion. 
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of the airfare to also considering the impact on its variance, where variance can 
be linked to price discrimina�on but also to cost drivers and to demand 
uncertainty. 7 , 8 . We also contribute to the literature studying the effect of 
compe��on on price dispersion, which up to now has not considered 
coopera�on agreements between compe�tors except for the recent work by 
Ciliberto et al. (2019) on codesharing. 
Given that this methodology is general, it can be applied to analyze 
compe��on and coopera�on in other industries. As shown by Kang and Sakai 
(2000), alliances have been widely implemented in the past. According to KPMG 
(2017), they are a valuable strategic opportunity for firms: “As cri�cal drivers of 
growth, strategic alliances should be up there with M&A as a top priority for 
CEOs.” Some examples from the car industry over the last 20 years are the 
General Motors-Fiat partnership, or the Fiat – Renault and Daimler -Uber 
partnerships. (See KPMG, 2017) Thus, our methodology can be a relevant tool to 
analyze the impact of a coopera�on agreements between firms when firms 
compete mainly in prices. 
In the next sec�on, we present the background to our work: our novel 
es�ma�on approach applied to the standard industry data set (subsec�on 2.1), 
and the literature on airline alliances and on the effect of compe��on on price 
dispersion (subsec�on 2.2 and 2.3 respec�vely), as our methodology allows us 
to inves�gate both features of the price distribu�on simultaneously. In Sec�on 3, 
we introduce our theore�cal model and the econometric specifica�on. Sec�on 4 
presents the data set and variables, and Sec�on 5 provides the empirical results. 
Lastly, Sec�on 6 concludes.  
2 Background 
2.1 The DB1B dataset 
The U.S. Department of Transporta�on (DOT) publishes a comprehensive price 
data source, the Airline Origin and Des�na�on Survey (DB1B). This survey is a 10 
percent sample of all airline �ckets sold in the U.S. domes�c market. It provides 
informa�on on the price paid for each �cket sold (called below the transac�on 
price) for a given market (or city pair) and for given product characteris�cs. The 
product characteris�cs are the atributes that dis�nguish different types of flights 
within the same market, namely, the opera�ng airline. Informa�on about the 
purchasing date and the flight characteris�cs, such as the scheduled flight date 
 
7 We direct the reader to Geradin and Petit (2005) or to Armstrong (2008) for a thorough discussion on 
the price discrimination theory and its effect on total and consumer welfare. 
8 There exist other potential sources of price dispersion such as demand uncertainty, costly capacity or 
peak load pricing. See, for instance, Gale and Holmes (1993), Deneckere, Marvel, and Peck (1996) or Dana 




and �me, is not available. Due to this limita�on, some�mes other databases 
aside from the DB1B are considered in the airline literature.  
For example, web data-scraping is one way to collect data on posted prices 
that includes the flight characteris�cs as well as the date and �me at which prices 
were posted. The structural approach applied to data collected from online 
sources has great research poten�al for airline dynamic pricing. See, for instance, 
Escobari (2012), Lazarev (2013), Williams (2013), Zhang et al. (2018). The main 
limita�on of this approach is that in most of the cases only posted prices are 
observed, but not the transac�on prices and the number of transac�ons. 
Moreover, structural models using this kind of data are so far limited to the 
monopoly case because of the high complexity of modeling compe��on in a 
dynamic framework. 
Computer reserva�on systems (CRS), such as Amadeus or Sabre, can provide 
informa�on on actual transac�ons, not only on posted prices, including 
informa�on on the purchasing date. However, only transac�ons that occur within 
the system are registered in this dataset. Informa�on from some airlines may be 
missing in certain markets, with no clear way to model or reconstruct the missing 
data. CRS data is usually sold at high prices to airlines and not generally accessible 
to researchers. As far as we know, the only excep�on is the work done by 
Sengupta and Wiggins (2012, 2014), Hernandez and Wiggins (2014) and Escobari 
and Hernandez (2019), who had access to one CRS for most of the carriers and 
domes�c routes within US.  
For these reasons, the DB1B remains the main source for analyzing different 
market and product features of the U.S. domes�c airline industry, such as 
compe��on, mergers, collusion, entry of low-cost carriers (LCC), hub premium, 
or loyalty programs, as in Borenstein and Rose (1991), Brueckner and Spiller 
(1991), Miller (2010), Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 
(1996), and Ciliberto and Williams (2010), respec�vely. These studies use the 
average market price or average product price as the dependent variable.  
As the database contains many prices with the same market and airline 
characteris�cs, the tradi�onal approach in the literature is to either study 
average prices (over markets and/or airlines) or price dispersion. Our work is the 
first to propose a joint analysis of the mean price and the price variability through 
a methodological contribu�on that allows us to work with individual transac�on 
prices from the DB1B. 
2.2 U.S. domes�c alliances 
The literature on domes�c airline alliances exclusively uses the DB1B data set, 
and the outcome variable is the average (at the market or product level) 
transac�on price. The alliance impact is typically measured by comparing the 
average prices before and a�er the alliance forma�on. Bamberger, Carlton and 
Neumann (2004) focus their analysis on the Con�nental/America West and 
Northwest/Alaska alliances; Arman�er and Richard (2006) es�mate the effect of 
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the Con�nental/Northwest alliance; Gayle (2007) studies the forma�on of the 
Con�nental/Northwest/Delta alliance. While Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann's 
(2004) results suggest lower prices for alliance markets, the last two studies find 
the opposite result. All three studies find an increase in traffic volumes. The 
authors interpret their results as sugges�ng that alliance partners are successful 
at expanding their customer base and employing price discrimina�on strategies. 
They conclude that, while the airline alliance can lead to higher overall prices, 
the outcome is not necessarily collusive or universally welfare reducing for 
consumers.  
To evaluate the overall effect of alliances on consumer surplus, Arman�er and 
Richard (2008) propose a structural discrete choice model, which uses individual 
transac�on prices as well as an auxiliary data set to circumvent the limita�ons of 
the DB1B. Their analysis demonstrates that, while consumers using direct flights 
do face higher prices, this is compensated by the overall improvement of service 
quality as a result of the alliance. This methodology is not as easily accessible as 
what we propose below, because it is computa�onally complex and requires 
detailed data to supplement the DB1B. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the type of coopera�on between 
alliance partners as a product feature. Ito and Lee (2007) dis�nguish between 
virtual codeshared products (where one partner operates the flight and the other 
sells the �ckets on that flight) and tradi�onal codeshared products (where both 
partners are involved in the opera�on of the flight and both can sell �ckets). They 
report that 85 percent of their sample are virtual codeshare products and they 
are in direct compe��on with the airline’s own product in 70 percent of the 
markets. They conclude that alliance products are seen as inferior by consumers 
in comparison to pure online flights (that is, flights operated and marketed by the 
same airline) and used by airlines to price discriminate between consumers with 
different willingness to pay. Gayle (2007) performs a similar exercise, but he 
focuses on the effect of the presence of tradi�onal and virtual codeshare flights 
on the average market price; he finds that markets with tradi�onal codesharing 
products have lower average prices, while markets with virtual codesharing have 
higher average prices.  
While the literature atests that alliances (and more generally coopera�on) are 
a relevant factor influencing prices, the es�mated effects on average prices vary 
according to the employed methodology and the selected data subset. The 
model that we present in the next sec�on updates this evidence regarding a 
more recent period in the history of alliances, while complemen�ng the analysis 
of price means with that of price dispersion. 
2.3 Price dispersion in the airline industry 
Up to our knowledge, there is no theore�cal model analyzing how coopera�on 
affects price dispersion. A large branch of the empirical literature on airline 
markets has analyzed price dispersion and how it is affected by different market 
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features or by compe��on. Alderighi (2010) compiles the main results. As an 
outcome variable, these studies use aggregated measures of price dispersion 
such as the Gini coefficient tor the coefficient of varia�on. We are not aware of 
any study in this literature that analyze the impact of alliances.  
In a seminal paper, Borenstein and Rose (1994) regress the Gini coefficient on 
factors related to costs. They exploit the difference in the number of carriers 
across markets to measure compe��on, and they find a posi�ve effect on 
dispersion. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) pursue the same objec�ve by 
implemen�ng a before-a�er approach that uses fixed market effects to control 
for unobservable �me invariant market characteris�cs. They find the opposite 
result – a nega�ve effect of compe��on on price dispersion. Dai, Liu and Serfes 
(2013) find that the rela�onship between compe��on and price dispersion may 
be non-monotonic. Despite the methodological differences, the three studies 
used the DB1B database. Gaggero and Piga (2011) and Siegert and Ulbricht (2014) 
use web-scraping to collect posted price data for the European market. They find 
a nega�ve correla�on between compe��on and posted price dispersion, 
although the later shows that this correla�on is posi�ve when price dispersion 
is measured at the market level rather than the flight level.  
Using other types of price dispersion measures, Bachis and Piga (2011), Man�n 
and Koo (2009) and Hernandez and Wiggins (2014) find that price dispersion 
decreases with the level of compe��on . Gillen and Man�n (2009) and Sengupta 
and Wiggins (2014) find that compe��on does not generally affect price 
dispersion. Recently Chandra and Lederman (2018) find that the rela�onship 
depends on consumer heterogeneity and can be U-shaped. Overall, it appears 
that there is no clear consensus on the effect of compe��on on the variability of 
prices, or what measure of dispersion is most suitable. 
We find it to be an important omission that none of the aforemen�oned 
studies analyze the impact of coopera�on on price dispersion, despite the 
alliance and codesharing literature demonstra�ng that coopera�on certainly has 
a significant effect on price means. Only Ciliberto et al. (2019) show that the 
presence of codesharing agreements reduce price dispersion. Our study includes 
coopera�on measures over market with similar compe��on levels and 
establishes a link between the literature on price dispersion and that on alliances. 
3 A model of airline compe��on 
In this sec�on, we detail the assump�ons that allow us to establish the 
observa�onal equivalence of compe��on in the airline market with an auc�on 
model. We discuss the underlying determinants of costs; we outline the 
deriva�on of the maximum likelihood es�ma�on (MLE); we describe how to 





We propose a compe��ve framework aimed to depict appropriately the current 
economic environment faced by airlines. The recent trends in the industry, 
specifically service homogeniza�on, the large use of internet price search 
engines and high consumer price sensi�vity, mo�vate our assump�on that, in the 
short run, airlines proposing similar quality levels compete in prices given exis�ng 
capaci�es. 9  The airline industry benefits from one of the most sophis�cated 
inventory and price management systems: all the global distribu�on systems and 
many consul�ng firms propose tools and big data solu�on to monitor and 
responds to pricing of compe�ng carriers. 10  Airlines can observe their 
compe�tors’ prices and modify their behavior accordingly. In our data sample, 
the US domes�c flights during the third quarter of 2008-2019, 91.3% of the 
transac�ons for an average route and operator present different fares.  
Following the ra�onale of Klemperer (2004), we argue that this large variety of 
fares can be modelled if each �cket sale is viewed as a reverse11 English auc�on. 
Consider two airlines with different minimum prices at which they are willing to 
provide the service, what we call their reserva�on cost. The reserva�on cost 
comprises the opera�ng cost as well as the opportunity cost of the service. The 
opera�ng cost covers the explicit costs to provide the service on a market.12 The 
opportunity cost is the value an airline places on selling a �cket now, rela�ve to 
an uncertain sale of a �cket with a poten�ally higher price closer to the departure 
date.  
The airline with the lower reserva�on cost has a compe��ve advantage -- it 
can provide the service at a lower price than its compe�tor. The profit-
maximizing strategy of this airline is to offer a price that is not unnecessarily low; 
it "wins" the sale at the highest price (or bid) that guarantees a sale. In other 
 
9 We leave aside entry and exit issues, which are studied by Berry (1992). However, we control for the 
potential bias that this could represent by sensitivity checks that include origin and destination level fixed 
effects. 
10 For instance ”Sabre AirVision Fares Optimizer empowers airlines to strategically adjust their fares 
based on real-time market data. It recommends pricing structures based on customer segmentation and 




accesed december 2020.  
11 In a reverse auction, the auctioneer is a buyer and the participants are sellers who compete by offering 
prices (their bids) at which they are willing to provide the service. During an open auction of this kind, known 
as an English auction, competitors can observe each other’s bids (just as they do in our price competition 
set-up) and react to them. 
12 Operating costs are defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization to include aircraft or direct 
operating costs such as fuel, aircraft servicing costs such as handling, traffic service costs such as meals or 




words, the most compe��ve airline makes a sale by offering a bid that slightly 
undercuts the reserva�on cost of its compe�tor.13  
The airlines observe their compe�tor’s bids, while they do not observe their 
compe�tor’s costs. Each airline bid depends on the compe�tor’s bids, and the 
privately know reserva�on cost. The reserva�on cost of any airline, at any point 
in �me, can be split into two parts with respect to its sta�s�cal nature and its 
relevance for the airlines. In the language of sta�s�cs, there is a determinis�c 
component that is common and observed by all compe�tors. For example, the 
fuel cost to cover the distance between the ends of a market. There is also a 
random component that is private knowledge and has private relevance to the 
cost of an airline, for example, the opportunity cost for each airline at a given 
moment of �me. Therefore, we consider that: 
Assump�on 1: The random component of reservation costs is an independent 
private value. 
Auc�ons are repeated among players with capacity constraints and an ideal 
model should account for these interac�ons; however, the DB1B dataset does 
not provide any informa�on on the acquisi�on date which impedes analyzing 
such dynamics. We treat the individual �cket sales as realiza�ons of independent 
auc�on games. Therefore, the private random component of each airline in each 
sale is drawn anew from a probability distribu�on that is independent and 
iden�cal across airlines and across sales. This simplifica�on with respect to reality 
allows us to treat transac�on prices individually via a methodology based on 
Paarsch (1997)’s approach for es�ma�ng auc�on outcomes that as we will 
explain in the next subsec�on. 
Our last assump�on allows us to model price variability within a market using 
market characteris�cs. The DB1B prices exhibit significant variability driven by 
the unavailable flight characteris�cs and purchasing date, and the literature has 
treated this issue by averaging prices at the market level. We conjecture that 
flight characteris�cs and purchasing dynamics are endogenous to the market 
fundamentals. Unlike previous work, we propose to model this variability by 
making the following assump�on:  
Assump�on 2: Market characteristics are determining factors of flight 
characteristics and advance purchasing dynamics, and thus, of price variability 
within a market. 
For example, in a large metropolitan market we would expect mul�ple flights 
due to the large and diverse popula�on compared to smaller metropolitan areas 
 
13 Our model is in line with the widely-spread yield management method of bid price control. In practice, 
there are several techniques that the airline can use to increase their revenue, some of which involve the 
estimation of a marginal cost of each seat on a plane, at each moment in time. One such method is bid price 
control, where this marginal cost is used as a bid -- an optimum cut-off required to accept a booking. These 
bids correspond to reservation cost in our model, below which airlines are unwilling to sell tickets. Bid prices 
are dynamically adjusted over time to reflect the changing reservation cost under dynamic demand. This 
practice has been analyzed in the operations management literature by Talluri and Van Ryzin (1998) and 
Adelman (2007), among others. 
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with smaller frequencies; as a result, price variability would be higher because 
different flights have different opera�ng costs. Higher or more diverse popula�on 
income would affect the advance purchasing paterns. For instance, more last-
minute business travels would cause the opportunity costs to increase 
significantly. Thus, the market features, in terms of income and size, determine 
the unobserved flight features and the advance purchasing paterns over �me. 
This ra�onale allows us to model the variability of airfares as a func�on of the 
market features. 
A limita�on of the model is that the following two scenarios are not considered 
due to data limita�ons. First, our se�ng implies that both airlines have available 
seats on their flights. If a flight is fully booked, the airline with free capacity can 
act as a monopoly and in this sense the proposed model cannot work. This 
limita�on of the model should be alleviated by the limited number of sales under 
this scenario that implies a 100% load factor. Second, travellers with willingness 
to pay comprised between the competitor’s reservation costs, will not make a 
transaction. Given richer data, an auction model that includes these special cases 
could be identified and estimated (Athey, Haile, Econometrica 2002).  
3.2 The model 
In this sec�on, we patern the equilibrium bidding strategy in a reverse English 
auc�on under the independent private values paradigm. We iden�fy the players 
and describe each player’s own informa�on, available strategies and rewards; 
finally, we characterize the equilibrium. We consider exclusively duopolies for the 
sake of simplicity.14  
Suppose that a single buyer (namely, the consumer or the traveler) wishes to 
purchase one �cket in a market with two players (that is, the sellers or the 
airlines). Each player has a reserva�on cost to provide the �cket, which we 
denote c. The strategies available to the sellers are their bids (announced, posted 
or offered price) as a func�on of the reserva�on cost. The game proceeds as 
follows. The consumer only cares about prices and compares the airlines' 
offers. 15  The players fully observe, and can react to, each other's prices. 
Whenever it is profitable for them to do so, they can undercut the price of the 
compe�tor to win the sale. Each player is willing to lower one's price up to p = c, 
but not lower. The winner is the player with the lowest reserva�on cost who 
undercuts slightly the opponent with the highest reserva�on cost. The resulting 
transaction price corresponds to the highest reservation cost among the two 
players.  
 
14 Scenarios with more than two players imply asymmetry of the players, as usually only two of them 
will be in an alliance. Asymmetry would add significant complexity to the analysis without broadening the 
contribution of the methodology. 
15  For example, consumers may use one of many and very popular websites offering search and 
comparison services, such as Kayak, Expedia, Orbitz and Travelocity, that allow consumers to enter their 
trip parameters and obtain a price ranking. 
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To es�mate this model, we implement the MLE methodology for auc�on data 
proposed by Paarsch (1997). Given the equilibrium of the game, the observed 
transac�on price is a func�on of the reserva�on cost: It is the highest reserva�on 
cost from two independent and iden�cal reserva�on cost draws. Let us assume 
that the reserva�on cost has a cumula�ve distribu�on F and a respec�ve density 
f in ℝ⋆ . Moreover, we assume that the reserva�on cost follows a logarithmic 
normal distribu�on with mean μ and standard devia�on σ, its natural logarithm 
being a normally distributed variable.16  
Deno�ng by o(d) the city at origin (des�na�on, respec�vely), a market is 
defined as a direc�onal city pair od.17 The likelihood of an observa�on i in the 
market od is the occurrence probability that an airline sells �cket i at a price piod 
for a travel from o to d. For clarity of the exposi�on, the exact deriva�on of the 
likelihood, which is standard, is le� for Appendix A. The likelihood of a single price 
observa�on is writen as: 
 ( ) ( )2 , ,iod iod od od iod od odL F p f pµ σ µ σ=   (1) 
The MLE approach yields es�mates for the distribu�on parameters (µod, and 
σod) such that the resul�ng price distribu�on approximates the observed sample 
of individual observa�ons as close as possible. 
The task is now to es�mate the parametric effect of variables of interest 
(notably the presence of alliances) on the distribu�on of reserva�on costs. 
Through the distribu�onal rela�onship between the reserva�on cost and the 
transac�on price, we derive how these variables ul�mately affect the transac�on 
price distribu�on. To do so, we discuss in the next subsec�on how the 
distribu�on parameters are iden�fied and es�mated. 
3.3 Model Specifica�on  
Let Xod be a vector of N variables relevant to the market od. These determinis�c 
market factors affect the mean and standard devia�on of the reserva�on cost 
distribu�on according to 
 
'
od odXµ α=  , (2) 
 
'
od odXσ β=  , (3) 
where α and β are the N-parameter vectors of the underlying reserva�on cost 
distribu�on to be es�mated.  
 
16 The advantage of the logarithmic-normal distribution is that it allows us to interpret the coefficients 
of all the continuous explanatory variables as elasticities, as the explanatory variables themselves are 
transformed by taking their natural logarithm. This approximation is valid whenever the effects are 
relatively small, as is the case for our results.  
17 The directional definition provides the basis for the delineation of relevant market in many studies. 
See Gayle (2007) and Berry and Jia (2010) or Luttmann (2018). There exist a 10,4% difference on average 
fares between directions on the city pairs in our sample. 
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Our main interest is how these market factors affect the actual transac�on 
prices. As already discussed, the observed transac�on price has a distribu�on 
that is a func�on of the underlying reserva�on cost, that is, the highest out of 
two reserva�on cost draws. Let us denote the corresponding mean and standard 
devia�on of the price distribu�on as mod and sod, respec�vely. Then, following 
the deriva�on in Nadarajah and Kotz (2008), we can express the parameters of 
the price distribu�on in terms of those of the reserva�on cost distribu�on.18 The 
mean of the transac�on price, mod, is a combina�on of µod, and σod, the mean 
and standard devia�on of the reserva�on cost distribu�on. The price standard 
devia�on, sod, is simply the scaled standard devia�on of the reserva�on cost. The 
marginal effects of the set of variables Xod on mod and sod, denoted below as a 
and b, respec�vely, can then be simply calculated using the marginal effects α 
and β of the reserva�on cost distribu�on as: 
 ' 'od
od od od od








  (4) 
 ' '
1 1





= = =   (5) 
where π represents the number pi. 
Looking at Equa�on (4), we can infer that the average transac�on price is larger 
than the average reserva�on cost. However, we cannot conclude if the impact of 
the nth variable in Xod will be larger over transac�on prices than over reserva�on 
costs. The ranking depends on the signs and rela�ve magnitude of αn and βn 
coefficients. If they have the same sign, then the impact on the mean price, an, is 
larger than the impact on the reserva�on cost. If they have different signs, the 
overall effect depends on their rela�ve magnitude and significance. It may be the 
case that both αn and βn are significant but of opposite sign, and an is 
insignificant.19  
According to Equa�on (5), the variables Xod have a smaller impact on the price 
standard devia�on, sod, than on the reserva�on cost standard devia�on, σod, 
since �𝜋𝜋−1
𝜋𝜋
< 1. The distribu�on of prices presents a lower standard devia�on 
because observed prices are reserva�on costs that are selected in a “direc�onal” 
way -- we take the highest from two. 
4 Data and explanatory variables 
 
18 The exact forms of the different moments of the distribution of order statistics have been known for 
a while and are available in many good reference books such as David and Nagaraja (2003). 
19 Coefficients in vectors b and β share the same statistical significance. The significance of coefficients 
in vector a is calculated by representing them as a combination of two randomly distributed normal 
variables (α and β). 
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We exploit the DB1B data for the third quarter of 2008-2019, and we select all 
markets sa�sfying three condi�ons. First, we exclusively consider duopolies 
where only two airlines operate. Duopolies represent 33% of the observed 
markets and 18.2% of the passengers during the period 2008-2019. The data 
cleaning process is explained in Appendix B. Second, all the proposed flights must 
be direct flights. Our methodology requires that the airlines propose equivalent 
products and compete exclusively on prices, therefore we restrict our analysis to 
firms with similar size imposing that market shares do not exceed 60%. 
Furthermore, our analysis concerns only markets where major legacy carriers 
operate. We do not consider LCCs and markets where they operate. The cost 
structure of LCCs is different from that of legacy carriers, and moreover, they do 
not enter alliances, which makes them an unsuitable group to use for 
comparison.20  
In our defini�on of an alliance, we follow Ito and Lee (2007). Carriers are 
alliance partners if passengers on one of the alliance carriers can earn elite-
qualifying frequent flyer miles on flights marketed or operated by the other 
alliance partner and vice versa. The alliance presence is defined at the market 
level. The market can either be an alliance market (Allianceod = 1) if both carriers 
are in the same alliance, or a non-alliance market (Allianceod = 0) if the carriers 
are not in an alliance together. In this sense, we do not model explicitly the exact 
type of coopera�on products or level of coordina�on (flight scheduling, sharing 
equipment and personnel, revenue sharing or else) that occurs within alliance 
markets. Table 1 shows the evolu�on of alliances among US legacy carriers over 
the last decade. 21 
Following Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013) we include as legacy carriers 
American Airlines(AA), Con�nental (CO), Delta (DL), Midwest (YX), Northwest 
(NW), United (UA), and US Air (US). Over the dura�on of the sample, several 
mergers led to an increase in concentra�on and only 4 legacy carriers remain: AA, 
AS, DL and US. This leads to a decrease in coopera�on, both in the number of 
alliances and in the number of codeshared �ckets. We observe that passengers 
flying with codesharing �ckets have decreased dras�cally since the departure of 
US Airways from Star Alliance. Codeshared passengers represented on average 
3.4% before 2014 on the DB1B database while they only represent 0.2% 
a�erwards. 
Among the considered alliances, only the AA/AS alliance remains ac�ve in the 
US domes�c market in 2021. While most of the passengers in the US domes�c 
market keep flying in airlines belonging to an interna�onal alliance (namely, 
American, Delta or United Airlines) the interac�on between the members of each 
interna�onal alliance, in the form of domes�c alliances, have decreased 
 
20 Regional-legacy carrier agreements are not considered to be alliances but rather an integrated service. 
As is standard in the literature, we recode tickets sold by regional carriers as the legacy partner. 
21 We also considered connecting markets, howevers alliance presence in such markets is negligible in 
the US domestic market since 2011. 
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dras�cally. Table 2 presents the evolu�on of duopoly market passengers in allied 
and non-allied markets. As you can see, this number is very low after the 
economic crisis in 2009 until 2014, and then starts to decrease again in 2017. 
 
Carriers Begin End 
Alaska/American 1999 - 
Alaska/Con�nental March 1999 CO merged with UA October 2009 
Alaska/Northwest August 1999 NW merged with DL January2010 
United/US Airways January 2003 US moved to Oneworld March 2014 
Con�nental/Delta June 2003 CO merged with UA October 2009 
Con�nental/Northwest June 2003 CO merged with UA October 2009 
Alaska/Delta November 2004 Ends in May 2017 
 
An underlying assump�on of our model is a stable market structure. For this 
reason, we find that data from years with mergers is less suitable because firms’ 
costs and objec�ves are changing. The results presented here are based on a 
sample for 2015 and 2016, however the results are robust if we consider different 
subsamples or if we include more years in the dataset as presented in subsec�on 
5.2. 
4.1 Explanatory variables 
Our explanatory variables Xod include market, origin and des�na�on 
characteris�cs and are obtained from the DB1B and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
These variables affect the opera�ng and/or opportunity costs in a determinis�c 
(non-random) manner. The complete list of variables and their defini�on is 
displayed in Table 3. Distance is a product-level variable that is measured in 
number of miles flown between the origin and des�na�on airports, including the 
outbound and inbound flights. The distance impacts the level of opera�ng costs, 
as longer distances require more fuel to reach the des�na�on. Distance can also 





Alliances Evolu�on on Direct Duopolies 
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 Number of passengers 
Year Duopoly markets 
Duopoly allied 
markets  
2008 38,099 13,044 
2009 48,215 15,358 
2010 50,743 9,828 
2011 27,922 8,776 
2012 30,566 4,353 
2013 26,887 5,853 
2014 20,79 12,376 
2015 31,709 16,995 
2016 25,076 18,466 
2017 41,506 5,002 
2018 61,136 2,367 
2019 65,77 3,455 
 
Our demographic measures -- Population and Income -- are measured at the 
origin and des�na�on ci�es. Higher income ci�es have both richer leisure 
travelers who do not need to plan in advance and more business travelers who 
book �ckets in the last days before departure. We therefore expect high income 
to lead to a higher average and a lower variability for the reserva�on cost. 
Population, on the other hand, is a measure of market size and could be 
associated with lower opera�ng costs, as larger scale opera�ons are more 
efficient. However, the effect of Population over the reserva�on cost is not clear 
since a larger popula�on can also imply higher opportunity costs, as more buyers 
are expected to arrive closer to the departure date. We construct four variables 
that describe the market in rela�on to the network. Origin volume and 
Destination volume measure the total number of domes�c �cket sales at the 
origin and des�na�on of the market, respec�vely, to passengers traveling to any 
point in the airport’s network. To quan�fy the market’s centrality in the network, 
we build two variables; Origin markets and Destination markets. Origin markets 
counts the number of ci�es directly accessible from the origin, while Des�na�on 
markets counts the number of ci�es from which one can fly to the des�na�on. 
The centrality in a network affects opera�ng costs through scope economies and 
the alterna�ve use of resources (planes, personnel) in adjacent markets.  
As a further measure of the importance of the origin and des�na�on we 
include the variables Origin hub and Destination hub. The hub variables are 
defined at the airport level and measure the number of connec�ng domes�c 
passengers. The large scale of opera�ons at hub airports may reduce opera�ng 
costs, but costs may also fluctuate more as the airline allocates aircra� capacity 
among connec�ng passengers from different origins and des�na�ons.  
We include a dummy controlling for the presence of codesharing passengers. 
Codesharing may affect to both cost and prices although it is not clear the effect 
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direc�on (see for instance Zou and Chen 2017 for a discussion on possible effects). 
Finally, we use a dummy variable to indicate the alliance presence, which we 







List of variables and their defini�on 
Variable Descrip�on 
Distance The roundtrip distance between the two city endpoints of the 
market measured in miles. 
Origin population The origin city's popula�on. 
Destination population The des�na�on city's popula�on. 
Origin income The origin city's median income (GDP) in US dollars. 
Destination income The des�na�on city's median income (GDP) in US dollars. 
Origin volume Number of domes�c passengers depar�ng from the origin. 
Destination volume Number of domes�c passengers depar�ng from the 
des�na�on. 
Origin markets Number of markets accessible from the origin. 
Destination markets Number of markets accessible from the des�na�on. 
Origin hub 
Number of domes�c passengers connec�ng at the origin 
airport. 
Destination hub 
Number of domes�c passengers connec�ng at the des�na�on 
airport. 
Alliance Dummy equal to 1 if the two carriers opera�ng on the market 
are in an alliance. 
Codeshare Dummy equal to 1 if at least one passenger use codeshared 
�ckets between the carriers on a market. 
 
4.2 Alliance presence 
The literature on the impact of airline alliances has approached the es�ma�on 
of their effect in two ways. Ito and Lee (2007) look at the prices of different types 
of alliance products within the same market. Gayle (2007) and Bamberger, 
Carlton and Neumann (2004), on the other hand, look at the effect of introducing 
an alliance product in a given market. In our methodology, we compare prices 
across markets (cross-sectionally), rather than before and a�er the agreement, 
to es�mate how the presence of the agreement affects them.  
Ex-ante, it is not obvious how the alliance presence could affect the level and 
variability of the reserva�on cost, as there are several poten�al effects working 
in opposite direc�ons. On the one hand, alliances are allowed to share certain 
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opera�ng costs such as personnel and airport facili�es, which could reduce 
opera�ng costs. On the other hand, the ability to coordinate schedules and to 
sell �ckets on a compe�tor’s flights can make price discrimina�on more 
profitable, affec�ng the opportunity cost and how it evolves over �me. The 
Alliance variable thus measures the overall effect of the alliance on the 
reserva�on cost’s mean and standard devia�on. 
An important assump�on in our approach is that, a�er controlling for all 
observed variables, alliance markets must be comparable to non-alliance 
markets. In other words, there are no unobservable factors that make the 
alliance more profitable in the specific markets where the alliance operates. If 
this were not true, the es�mated alliance effect would also contain the effect of 
the unobserved factors, hence it would be biased. To avoid this problem, 
Brueckner (2003) uses a model with entry. Another more direct approach that is 
used by Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and Ito and Lee (2007) is to introduce fixed 
effects, which we consider in Subsec�on 5.2. 
4.3 Summary sta�s�cs 
Table 4 presents the summary sta�s�cs dis�nguishing between alliance and non-
alliance markets for 2015 and 2016. As our dataset is based on direc�onal city 
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pairs, summary sta�s�cs are weighted by the volume of passengers.22 Overall, 
there do not seem to be significant differences in market characteris�cs between 
alliance and non-alliance markets. The only excep�on is that alliance markets 
present longer distances, given the presence of several markets between the east 
and west coast. The same magnitudes are observed if the full sample, 2008-2019, 
is considered. 
Although the variables are presented here in levels, for the es�ma�on they are 
transformed by taking their natural logarithm. This transforma�on allows us to 
interpret the coefficients of all con�nuous variables as elas�ci�es. In other words, 
each es�mated coefficient represents the percentage change in the mean µod or 
the standard devia�on σod of the reserva�on cost given one percent change in 
the relevant variable. The Alliance coefficient, however, is a dummy, and its 
interpreta�on is slightly different; we mul�ply the es�mated coefficient by 100 
to obtain the percentage change of the mean or standard devia�on of the 
reserva�on cost when Alliance = 1. This interpreta�on is also relevant for the 
price mean and standard devia�on, mod and sod, respec�vely. The effects of the 
explanatory variables on mod and sod are derived using Equa�ons (4) and (5). 
 
 
22 The data cleaning process explained in Appendix B leads to a database where not all our markets are 
present in both directions in our database. For instance, we impose that the two carriers present in the 
market must cumulate 95% of the market share, which could be satisfied in one direction and not 
necessarily in another one. Same results are obtained if we restrict the sample to city pairs were both 
directions are observed. 
23 As our dataset considers only roundtrip passengers, both the price and distance reflect the full price 
and full distance (outbound and inbound flight). 
Table 4 
Average values by alliance presence 
 Alliance Non-Alliance  
Price ($) 497.84 539.85  
Distance (Miles)23 4059 2058  
Origin popula�on 3,340,968 5,615,129  
Des�na�on popula�on 4,798,379    4,518,930  
Origin income ($) 74,643 65,753  
Des�na�on income ($) 61,728 61,497  
Origin volume 5,241,427 6,268,399  
Des�na�on volume 7,130,162 5,302,370  
Origin markets 105 137  
Des�na�on markets 91 129  
Origin hub 1,248,352 921,801  
Des�na�on hub 3,445,245 1,377,329  
Codeshare 0.179 0  
Alaska Airlines 4,049 946  
American Airlines 1,759 12,381  
Delta Airlines 2,413 8,285  




5 Empirical results 
In subsec�on 5.1, we present the es�ma�on results from equa�ons (2) - (5) using 
the full set of covariates measuring the market characteris�cs. Our main results 
are presented in sub-sec�on 5.2, where we control for unobserved origin or 
des�na�on factors not included among our explanatory variables by re-
es�ma�ng our model with fixed effects. These results indicate that omited 
variable bias is a valid concern and that fixed effect es�ma�on is preferred. Finally, 
in subsec�on 5.3 we present the results for the coefficient of varia�on.  
5.1 Es�ma�on with market covariates 
Table 5 contains the results from the es�ma�on of equa�ons (2), (3), (4) and (5). 
The results indicate that the Alliance variable has a nega�ve significant effect on 
both the mean and standard devia�on of the reserva�on cost. This translates to 
nega�ve effects on the mean and standard devia�on of the transac�on prices. 
We revisit this result in the next sec�on, where for robustness we re-es�mate 
the model with fixed effects. Below, we comment on the coefficients on the 
market covariates.  
Distance has a posi�ve impact on the mean of the reserva�on costs, which is 
due to the cost of fuel and other opera�ng expenses. At the same �me, higher 
distance is associated with lower varied reserva�on costs. This finding could be 
explained considering the op�on to subs�tute air travel with land travel. It is 
likely that airlines need to provide a larger variety of fares in shorter trips in order 
to be able to atract tourist demand that is sensi�ve to surface transporta�on 
compe��on. 
The demographic variables popula�on and income are associated with higher 
reserva�on cost and transac�on price means. Both variables are likely to 
generate a higher chance of last-minute �cket purchases, which increases the 
opportunity costs of �cket sales. Bigger ci�es are also associated with more 
products in terms of flight characteris�cs, and therefore price variability.  
The origin and des�na�on volume are associated with a lower reserva�on cost 
and transac�on price means, which is likely due to economies of density and 
scale. Des�na�on volume is also associated with a lower reserva�on cost and 
transac�on price variance. The variables related to network centrality, the hub 
and des�na�on markets at origin and des�na�on, are all associated with a higher 
reserva�on cost and transac�on price, possibly due to the high opportunity cost 
of equipment, �me slots for landing and take-off, and staff. However, airports 
with a larger number of connec�ng passengers show more variability while 
markets with more connec�ons have less variability in their reserva�on cost and 
transac�on price.  






Finally, codesharing presents a posi�ve effect both on the reserva�on cost and 
transac�on prices. The posi�ve effect on transac�on prices thanks to 
codesharing agreements have been already illustrated in the theore�cal and 
Table 5 
MLE estimation results  
 Reservation cost  Transaction price 
 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝜎𝜎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝜎𝜎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
Alliance -0.188*** -0.025***  -0.202*** -0,021*** 
 (0.008)    (0.006)     (0,008) (0,005) 
Distance 0.136*** -0.012***  0.130*** -0,010*** 
 (0.006)    (0.004)     (0,005) (0,003) 
Origin popula�on 0.118*** 0.007*    0.122*** 0.006 
 (0.007)    (0.004)     (0,007) (0,003) 
Dest. Popula�on 0.148*** 0.006     0.151*** 0.005** 
 (0.006)    (0.004)     (0,006) (0,004) 
Origin income 0.172*** -0.015     0.164*** -0.013 
 (0.024)    (0.017)     (0,024) (0,014) 
Des�na�on income 0.183*** 0.020     0.194*** 0.016 
 (0.026)    (0.020)     (0,026) (0,017) 
Origin volume -0.176*** -0.007     -0.180** -0.006 
 (0.011)    (0.008)     (0,011) (0,006) 
Des�na�on volume -0.247*** -0.021***  -0.259*** -0,017*** 
 (0.010)    (0.007)     (0,010) (0,006) 
Origin markets 0.053*** -0.028***  0.038*** -0.023*** 
 (0.013)    (0.007)     (0,010) (0,006) 
Des�na�on markets 0.062*** -0.034***  0.042*** -0,028*** 
 (0.006)    (0.004)     (0,005) (0,003) 
Origin hub 0.032*** 0.006***  0.036*** 0.005** 
 (0.003)    (0.002)     (0,003) (0,002) 
Des�na�on hub 0.044*** 0.008***  0.049*** 0.007*** 
 (0.003)    (0.002)     (0,003) (0,002) 
Codeshare 0.175*** 0.022**   0.188*** 0.018** 
 (0.013)    (0.010)     (0.012)    (0.008)    
Dummy 2016 -0.045*** -0.059***  -0.078*** -0.047***  
 (0.005)    (0.004)     (0.005)    (0.003)    
Constant 1.980*** 0.776**   2.418*** 0.641 *** 
 (0.416)    (0.320)     (0,454) (0,264) 




Note: Standard error are given in parentheses. The symbols */**/*** indicate sta�s�cal 
significance at the 5/1/0.1 % level, respec�vely. 
22 
 
empirical literature (see for instance Alamdari(2005), Adler and Hanani (2016) or 
Zou and Chen (2017)). There are few studies on the impact of codesharing on 
opera�ng cost and they find weak evidence (Chua et al. 2005 or Goh and Yong 
2006). As detailed on the next sec�on, the impact of codesharing is reduced 
when fixed effects are included.  
5.2 Es�ma�on with fixed effects 
In this subsec�on, we propose to control for unobserved origin and des�na�on 
factors that may correlate with Alliance and could bias its effect by re-es�ma�ng 
our model with origin and des�na�on fixed effects. The es�mated effects of the 
Alliance and Codeshare variable on the reserva�on cost and the transac�on price 
are reported in Table 6. 
The results indicate that omited variable bias is a valid concern. Alliance does 
not have a significant impact on the mean of the reserva�on cost. The effect of 
Alliance on the standard devia�on of the reserva�on cost is instead more 
nega�ve, -17.5 percent. These results suggest that alliance partners manage to 
reduce cost fluctua�on although this does not come with a decrease in the 
average costs. Due to data limita�ons it is beyond our scope to model how exactly 
this is achieved, but some poten�al explana�ons could be harmonizing the 
demand forecasts, physical resources and opera�ons scheduling. The lower cost 
variance has a nega�ve and significant effect on the mean and standard devia�on 
of the transac�on: -10.2 percent and -14.4 percent. In other words, prices are 
lower and less varied in alliance markets because of the lower variance of costs. 
On the other hand, Codeshare presents a posi�ve effect on both reserva�on 
cost (+8.61 percent) and transac�on prices (+4.7 percent). S�ll, the cumulated 
effect of both coopera�on variables remains nega�ve and the results for the 
Alliance variable are not affected if codeshared markets are excluded. 
These result also holds if other periods are considered although the size of the 
impact varies across the years. For robustness, we run our model over 2008-2019 
excluding years were mergers were taking place (2010, 2014 and 2017) and 
including interac�ons of Alliance and codeshare with a �me trend. Alliance does 
not have a significant impact on prices or reserva�on costs at the beginning of 
the sample though it has a nega�ve and significant impact (-0.006*** for prices) 
when interacted with the �me trend. Codesharing presents a posi�ve and 
significant effect at the beginning of our sample (0.186***) and a nega�ve trend 
across �me (-0.018***). With respect to dispersion, both reserva�on costs and 
transac�on prices start with a small posi�ve effect in 2008 thought the effect 
becomes nega�ve due to a nega�ve trend. These results must be interpreted 
with cau�on as both codesharing and alliances are decreasing in importance 
across �me in the US domes�c market. 
 
Table 6 
Alliance effect on the reserva�on and transac�on price distribu�ons 
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 Reserva�on cost  Transac�on price 
 𝜇𝜇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝜎𝜎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
Alliance -0.003 -0.175***  -0.102* -0.144*** 
 (0.059) (0.042)  (0. 050) (0.035) 
Codesharing 0.0861*** -0.070***  0.047** -0.058*** 
 (0.020) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.013) 
Note: Standard error are given in in parentheses; Origin and Des�na�on fixed effects are 
controlled for, but es�mates have been suppressed in the table. The symbols */**/*** indicate 
sta�s�cal significance at the 5/1/0.1 % level, respec�vely. N is the number of observa�ons. 
 
5.3 Coefficient of varia�on 
As argued in the introduc�on, the coefficient of varia�on (CV) is a standard metric 
for price dispersion in the literature. To be consistent with previous work, we 
present here the effect of Alliance on the CV of prices. The reserva�on cost and 
transac�on price are transformed by the natural logarithm in our es�ma�on; 
then, we construct the CV of transac�on prices using proper�es of moment 
genera�ng func�ons. The complete deriva�on of Equa�on (6) is presented in 
Sec�on C of the Appendix. Note that, in the end, the CV of prices is only a 
func�on of the standard devia�on of the log-reserva�on cost, σ, specifically:24  
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  (6) 
Since Alliance is an indicator rather than a con�nuous variable, its marginal 
effect is obtained as the difference between the CV when Alliance is one and zero, 
that is to say: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 0CV Alliance CV Alliance CV Alliance∆ = = − =   (7) 
For tes�ng the significance of the alliance effect, we use the es�mated 
standard devia�on of the log-reserva�on cost evaluated at either Alliance=1 and 
Alliance=0 and at the sample mean values for all other covariates.  
Table 7 contains the es�mated CVs, both for the model with covariates and the 
model with fixed effects. Alliance is associated with a decrease in CV, regardless 
of whether the model is es�mated with or without the fixed effects. A nega�ve 
impact is also found for codesharing similarly to the work by Ciliberto et al. (2009). 
The coopera�on among airlines affects price dispersion, which should not be 
omited when analyzing the rela�onship between compe��on and price 
 
24 In the formula, exp(.) indicates the exponential function and Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution of the 
standard normal function. 
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dispersion. The literature has not found a clear rela�onship between compe��on 
and price dispersion. In our sample, we should not observe price dispersion 
differences due to compe��on since all the markets have two compe�tors with 
similar market shares nevertheless we can observe the impact of coopera�on. In 
this sense our work is a new step contribu�ng to the work by Liu and Serfes (2006) 
and Chandra and Lederman (2018) that try to reconcile the conflic�ng results in 
the earlier literature.  
6 Conclusion 
Airline markets have gone through many transforma�ve changes in the last 
couple of decades. Low-cost carriers expanded their services and made standard 
the “no frills” type of service, decreasing the importance of service quality and 
increasing the homogeniza�on of the product. The spread of the Internet as a 
sales channel has been another challenge for the industry; consumers’ search 
and comparison costs became negligible using online travel agents and price 
comparison sites. Furthermore, the various economic crisis made all travelers, 
and par�cularly business travelers, very sensi�ve toward prices. We are 
mo�vated by these recent changes in the industry to propose a new es�ma�on 
method that models �cket sales as an auc�on process. This approach, which is 
the main novelty of the paper, is applicable to any online sales process based on 
price compe��on. 
We apply this model to revisit the analysis of airline alliances, a form of 
coopera�on in airline markets that has caused much controversy. Our novel 
approach allows us to work with the individual data observa�ons of the DB1B 
and to simultaneously explore the effect of alliances on price means and price 
variability, the later being completely novel to the alliance literature. Our results 
indicate that alliances are associated with both lower prices and lower price 
dispersion, and that they achieve this though a decrease in the fluctua�on of 
their reserva�on costs.  
These results contrast with previous results in the alliance literature by Gayle 
(2008) and Arman�er and Richard (2006), which were relevant to the post-
alliance forma�on period of the late 1990s and early 2000s. This difference could 
Table 7 
Alliance effect on the coefficient of varia�on of transac�on prices 
Model N CV(Alliance=1) CV(Alliance=0) ∆CV(Alliance) 
Covariates 40,504 0.289*** 0.312*** -0.023⋆⋆⋆ 
Fixed Effects 40,504 0.175*** 0.331*** -0.157⋆⋆⋆ 
Note: Standard error are given in in parentheses; Origin and Des�na�on fixed effects 
are controlled for, but es�mates have been suppressed in the table. The symbols */**/*** 




be well explained by the emerging compe��on from LCC and by the fact that 
alliance partners responded by improving their efficiency.  
Our results shed a new light on the debate of the impact of compe��on on 
price dispersion. Indeed, the literature studying this issue presented in 
Subsec�on 2.2 has not found a clear conclusion. Our analysis shows that markets 
with similar levels of compe��on present lower dispersion levels due to the 
presence of coopera�on, in the form of alliances. S�ll, more work is required to 
obtain a clearer picture on the mechanism behind these results. While the large 
number of recent mergers in the United States have decreased the importance 
of alliances, the proposed methodology could be applied to analyze the impact 
of coopera�on in other sectors or other types of coopera�on in the airline sector. 
In the case of airlines, codesharing has been a frequent issue of concern for 
compe��on authori�es. Diverse types of alliance or coopera�on agreements are 
present in a wide range of industries, such as Financial services, Pharmaceu�cals, 
Automobile or So�ware. 25  
Beyond the ques�on of the impact of alliances in airline markets, we believe 
that our approach based on the econometrics of auc�on models can be easily 
applied to facilitate the analysis of any issue of interest in markets where 
compe��on is based on prices and when the analyst is interested in both price 
levels and dispersion. 
  
 
25 Kang and Sakai (2000) present a review of international strategic alliances between 1990 and 2000 by 
sector and by country or region. 
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Appendix A  
Order sta�s�cs and the maximum likelihood deriva�on 
To es�mate a model using the maximum likelihood approach, we need to 
specify the distribu�on by which our data is generated. In the framework that we 
propose, the price is an order sta�s�c of the reserva�on cost; it is the highest 
reserva�on cost from two randomly drawn reserva�on costs. Order sta�s�cs and 
their distribu�on are important elements of auc�on models, where the winner 
is chosen based on a ranking of the bids, and the bids are usually a monotonic 
func�on of the underlying random costs or valua�ons. For a detailed exposi�on 
on the deriva�on of order sta�s�cs, see Paarsch and Hong (2006), par�cularly 
Appendices 1 and 2 in their book. Here, we will explain intui�vely how the 
distribu�ons are derived in our model. 
Both carriers l and m offer the same service and draw their reserva�on costs, 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 and 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚, from the same distribu�on F(c). A price observa�on takes the value p 
in two dis�nct cases: in the case where player l makes the sale, and in the case 
where player m makes the sale.  
Let us take the last case, where player m makes the sale, which is an outcome 
of two independent events happening simultaneously. Given the strategies of the 
players to lower their offers/bids un�l it is no longer profitable, we know that the 
“loser”, carrier l, which has the higher reserva�on cost, will have reserva�on cost 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝 exactly. At the same �me, the “winner”, carrier m, or the carrier with the 
lower reserva�on cost, must have 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 < 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝 . These are two independent 
events, and therefore, the probability of observing price equal to p is the product 
of the probabili�es of the two events: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) wins m l lP p m P c c P c p= < =    (A1) 
The probability of the first event is the sum of all probabili�es for which 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 < 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝. With a con�nuous distribu�on, this is the cumula�ve density F(p). 
The probability of the second event is exactly the density of the distribu�on at p: 
f(p). Hence, we have:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )  winsP p m F p f p=   (A2) 
Similarly, due to the symmetry of the players, the case of observing p when 
player l wins has the following probability: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) wins P p l F p f p=   (A3) 
Then, the uncondi�onal event of observing the price p is the sum of the cases 
where l wins and m wins: 











We start with the full data available for the 2008 third quarter including all 
origin and des�na�ons within United States. We consider exclusively round-trip 
passengers. Carriers with less than 15 passengers are deleted, since these 
probably reflect coding errors. We also remove �ckets with prices lower than 50 
USD and higher than 3000 USD. Most of these happen to be �ckets at zero USD, 
represen�ng frequent flyer purchases. We also focus on markets with more than 
nine passengers per quarter, as that is equivalent to one passenger per day given 
that the sample represents 10 percent of the quarterly �cket sales. 
Another modifica�on of the data set comprises grouping airports in the same 
metropolitan area. 26  The six groups of airports are: Dallas-Fort Worth 
Interna�onal and Love Field in Dallas, TX; Bal�more/ Washington Interna�onal, 
Dulles, and Na�onal in Washington, DC; Midway and O’Hare in Chicago, IL; 
Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark in New York, NY; Los Angeles, Burbank, and 
Long Beach in Los Angeles, CA; San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose in San 
Francisco, CA. For example, Chicago Midway and Chicago O’Hare Interna�onal 
will represent the same market. Again, this is a standard treatment in the 
literature (Berry and Jia (2010)). Note this modifica�on affects only 
approximately 15 percent of our observa�ons, as we are working with duopoly 
markets that are usually markets less central to the network. Following Evan and 
Kessides (1993, 1994), we count carriers as opera�ng in each market if their sales 
represent at least 1 percent of observa�ons in the data, equivalently 1 percent 
of total sales. Regional “feeder” or “commuter” carriers are recoded as their 
major carrier partner. The full table can be provided upon request. 
We study exclusively direct duopoly markets, i.e., markets with only two 
opera�ng airlines. In any market, we might observe unusual choices by travelers 
using long paths (two or three connec�ng airports) due to capacity constraints in 
the supply or to random events such as bad weather condi�ons, technical issues 
on a plane or strikes. Therefore, we include in our database markets where a 
third airline exist with a market share smaller than 5% or markets where less than 
5% of the passengers use alterna�ve routes (for instance, flying with 3 coupons), 
although these passengers are excluded from our analysis. Once our sample is 
restricted to duopoly markets, we exclude all markets where an LCC is present. 
  
 
26 Note than not all the metropolitan areas that are usually considered in the literature are included in 




Coefficient of Varia�on Deriva�on 
The coefficient of varia�on (CV) is defined as the variable’s standard devia�on 
divided by the variable’s mean. In our case, we are interested on the transac�on 
price p with mean, m, and standard devia�on s. The CV can be expressed as: 
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  (C1) 
Our model analyzes the logarithm of the reserva�on costs in duopoly markets. 
We call log(cl) and log(cm) the logarithms of the reserva�on costs of our two 
compe�tors, airlines l and m, respec�vely. The logarithm of the transac�on price 
is the highest of the two reserva�on costs, log(p)=max(log(cl), log(cm)). 
With the moment genera�ng func�ons obtained from Nadarajah and Kotz 
(2008) for the max/min of two random variables, we can compute: 
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